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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
T. TRON BURGANDY. a.k.a, ] 
RONALD G. SMITH. ) 
Petitioner and Appellant, ] 
v. ] 
STATE OF UTAH, ] 
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN ] 
SERVICES, ; 
Respondent and Appellee. ] 
) Case No. 981504-CA 
I Category No. 14 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§78-2a-3(2)(a)(1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Utah law requires Mr. Burgandy to pay back General Assistance benefits which he 
received during the pendency of an unsuccessful appeal of his ineligibility determination. 
Utah Code Ann. § 35A-l-502(l)(b)(i), -502(2) (1997). Does the statute violate the open 
courts provision of the Utah Constitution, art. I, § 11, by unreasonably burdening his 
access to court for review of his ineligibility determination? 
1 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This issue sets forth a question of law which is reviewed for correctness. No 
special deference is given to the trial court's ruling on appeal. Bingham v. Bingham. 872 
P.2d 1065, 1067 (Utah App. 1994). 
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS 
The following provisions are relevant to the determination of this case: Utah Code 
Ann. § 35A-1-502 (1997) and the Utah Constitution, article I, section 11. The full text of 
these provisions is found in Addendum A. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
The Department of Human Services, Office of Family Support, notified Appellant 
Burgandy that his General Assistance benefits would be terminated due to his 
ineligibility. He challenged this finding in a Fair Hearing. Burgandy elected to receive 
General Assistance benefits pending the hearing determination. He lost that hearing, thus 
incurring an overpayment of General Assistance benefits. Burgandy contends that Utah 
Code Ann. § 35A-1-502, which requires repayment of benefits for which one is ineligible, 
is unconstitutional as applied to him. He argues that the possibility of repayment of 
benefits received pending the fair hearing determination burdens his right of access to the 
courts and violates article I, section 11 of the Utah Constitution. 
2 
DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW 
The Second District Court entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and a 
Judgment and Order on July 13, 1997, affirming that Burgandy had incurred an 
overpayment of $726.00, and concluding that requiring him to pay it back did not chill or 
burden his right to access the court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
T. Tron Burgandy began receiving General Assistance (GA) benefits in May 1994. 
(R. at 137) While receiving those benefits, he applied to the Social Security 
Administration for Social Security and Social Security Disability Insurance benefits. (R. 
at 137) The Ogden Office of Family Support notified Burgandy on July 21, 1994, that his 
case would be closed effective July 31, 1994. (R. at 137) He was determined ineligible 
for GA because the Form 21- G Medical Report that he provided to his caseworker 
indicated he could perform work with slight to moderate limitations. (R. at 60) 
Burgandy requested a fair hearing to challenge the finding of ineligibility and case 
closure. (R. at 43) Additionally, he requested that his General Assistance be continued 
pending the outcome of the hearing. (R. at 39) The HEARING RIGHTS/REQUEST 
FOR HEARING form notifies Burgandy: 
If the hearing decision supports the agency action and you are 
not successful in any further appeal of that decision, you may 
have an overpayment if you receive continued or reinstated 
benefits. You will have to pay back any overpayment. 
3 
(R. at 43) A fair hearing was held on August 16. 1994 sustaining the closure of his 
case. (R. at 39) Burgandv subsequently requested agency review of that hearing. (R. at 
40) 
Because he was found ineligible for benefits, the Office of Recovery Services 
(ORS) initiated a recovery action for overpaid benefits by serving Burgandy with a 
Notice of Agency Action: Overpayment Determination. The Notice alleged that 
Burgandy incurred an overpayment for benefits received during the time his fair hearing 
was pending. (R. at 40) This administrative action was stayed pending the final result of 
Burgandy's fair hearing appeal. 
While the fair hearing determination was pending, the Social Security 
Administration notified Burgandy that he was found retroactively eligible for Social 
Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) benefits commencing September 1993. (R. at 40) 
The Director of the Office of Administrative Hearings affirmed the fair hearing decision, 
noting that Burgandy was not eligible for assistance under the provisions of the General 
Assistance Program, and that retroactive eligibility for SSDI was not determinative of 
General Assistance eligibility. (R. at 61) 
Burgandy did not pursue the eligibility determination further. He did challenge 
repayment of the overpayment in an administrative hearing held March 10, 1997. (R. at 
41) The Hearing Officer found Burgandy liable for repayment of the overpaid benefits. 
(R. at 70) 
4 
Burgandy. having exhausted required administrative remedies, filed a complaint 
for judicial review in the Second District Court alleging that repayment of benefits he 
received while awaiting the outcome of his original fair hearing decision violated article I, 
section 11 of the Utah Constitution. (R. at 4) Burgandy appeals from the adverse 
judgment against him. (Addendum B) He challenges the constitutionality of the statute 
requiring him to repay benefits for which he was ineligible, but does not challenge the 
determination of ineligibility. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Utah Code Ann. § 35A-1-502 does not violate article I, section 11 of the Utah 
Constitution. This section requires that any overpayment of public assistance be repaid to 
the State. Although a recipient has the right to a hearing before General Assistance 
benefits are terminated, there is no right to benefits for which the individual was not 
eligible. Administrative and judicial avenues of review afford the individual an 
opportunity to challenge agency actions and seek redress of injury. The fact that a 
recipient may have to repay benefits received pending an unsuccessful eligibility 
challenge is not an unreasonable burden on that individual's right to access the courts. 
An overpayment of assistance paid pending the fair hearing decision is not incurred 
because an individual exercises a hearing right. It occurs because the person received 




I. SECTION 35A-1-502 AND AGENCY POLICY REQUIRE 
REPAYMENT OF ALL OVERPAYMENTS OF PUBLIC 
ASSISTANCE, REGARDLESS OF THE CAUSE. 
A. The General Assistance Program. 
The General Assistance Program (GA) is established by Utah Code Annotated §§ 
35A-3-401 to -402 (1997). It is provided to individuals who 
[a]re not receiving cash assistance under Part 3, Family 
Employment Program, or Supplemental Security Income, and 
who are unemployable according to standards promulgated by 
the department. 
Utah Code Ann. § 35A-4-401(l)(a) (1997). The program provides temporary cash 
assistance to qualified individuals while they are working to become employed or to 
qualify for Social Security benefits. Utah Admin. Code R986-218-801(1) (1998). 
(Addendum A) It is a program that provides "financial assistance on a short term basis 
while participants are involved in medical and/or mental health treatment to overcome the 
limitations keeping them from employment." Id* Unlike other assistance programs that 
receive federal support, the GA program is funded solely with State monies. 
If the Office of Family Support1 determines that a recipient has become ineligible 
lrrhe program, during the time Burgandy was found ineligible for assistance and 
incurred the overpayment in question, was administered by the Department of Human 
Services, Office of Family Support (OFS). After Welfare Reform, the Department of 
Workforce Services was established and responsibility for public assistance programs was 
transferred to it. 
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for General Assistance, it notifies the individual that his or her case will be closed and 
benefits terminated. Utah-DHS-OFS Volume II Section 110. (Addendum C) However, 
under Goldberg v. Kellv. 397 U.S. 254, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970), a recipient 
is entitled to a hearing before the case is closed. Accordingly, the recipient is notified that 
he or she may request a fair hearing to contest the closure of the case. Utah-DHS-OFS 
Volume II Section 190. (Addendum C) When requesting a fair hearing, the recipient 
may elect to continue receiving benefits pending the decision or to have those benefits 
stopped.2 Utah-DHS-OFS Volume II Section 190-2. (Addendum C) If the Hearing 
Officer determines that the recipient's case was properly closed and that the eligibility 
criteria were not met, the recipient may have incurred an overpayment and must repay 
any benefits to which he or she was not entitled. Benefits received while the fair hearing 
is pending are generally referred to by agency workers as continued or reinstated benefits. 
B. Overpayments. 
Section 35A-1-502 addresses civil liability for overpayments of public assistance. 
This section defines an overpayment as 
money, public assistance, or any other thing of value provided under a state 
or federally funded benefit program to the extent that the person receiving 
2Section 190-2 (1) applies to a continuation of benefits pending the eligibility 
challenge. Section 190-2 (4)(A) discusses stopping the assistance at the recipient's 
request. The policy instructs workers to stop assistance if the recipient so requests in 
writing. The HEARING RIGHTS/REQUEST FOR HEARING form (R. at 43) allows the 
individual to check off whether they wish benefits to continue or stop. This is considered 
written notice. 
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the thing of value is not entitled to receive it or is not entitled to receive it at 
the level provided. 
Utah Code Ann. § 35A-1-502 (l)(b)(i) (1997).3 (Addendum A) The statute further 
requires that 
[e]ach provider, client, or other person who receives an 
overpayment shall, regardless of fault, return the overpayment 
3r repay its value to the department immediately: 
(a) upon receiving written notice of the overpayment 
from the department; or 
(b) upon discovering the overpayment, if that occurs 
prior to receiving notice. 
Utah Code Ann. § 35A-1-502(2) (1997). The statute also identifies conditions under 
which interest or civil penalties for fraudulent conduct by the recipient may be assessed. 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 35A-l-502(3) - (7) (1997). 
Agency policy instructs workers and recipients on operation of the various 
assistance programs. The policy governing the General Assistance program when 
Burgandy incurred this overpayment was found in Utah-DHS-OFS Volume II. Burgandy 
argues that Utah-DHS-OFS Volume II Section 840-1 limits recovery to three specific 
categories of overpayments, and that benefits received pending a fair hearing are a 
3In his brief, Burgandy cites to section 35A-1-502. However, in 1994, when this 
action began the provisions were found at section 62A-9-129. They were renumbered in 
1997 when the Department of Workforce Services assumed responsibility for 
administering public assistance programs. The use of the 1998 language has no bearing 
on the question of whether collection of the benefits in question burdens the right to 
access the courts. A copy of the 1994 statute is included in Addendum A. 
8 
separate category which agency policy never contemplated. Appellant's Brief at 7. This 
is an incorrect reading of policy. Section 840-1. which Burgandy relies on, addresses 
causes rather than categories of overpayment. Utah-DHS-OFS Volume II Section 840-1. 
(Addendum C) The three causes of overpayments listed are: inadvertent error, 
administrative error, and intentional violation. This is not an inclusive list of distinct 
overpayment classifications that the agency may collect.4 Likewise, an overpayment for 
benefits received while the fair hearing is pending is not a separate class of overpayment. 
The term "continued benefits" is merely terminology used by OFS and its workers as 
reference to the time period in which the benefits were issued. It is not a designation of 
overpayment type.5 
Neither the statute nor agency policy implemented to carry it out restrict the 
4This section of policy instructs the OFS worker to refer all overpayments to the 
Office of Recovery Services (ORS). The OFS worker identifies the cause when referring 
the overpayment to Recovery Services so that ORS handles it appropriately. For 
example, if the overpayment is caused by fraudulent conduct, the statute provides for civil 
penalties and program disqualifications. Penalties are not sought if the case is referred for 
an overpayment based on the recipient's mistake or an agency error. 
5When referring the overpayment to ORS, the OFS worker codes an overpayment 
for benefits received pending a fair hearing as inadvertent error. Barring evidence to the 
contrary, the worker assumes that the hearing was requested because the recipient 
mistakenly believed he or she was eligible for benefits. It is then treated as such under 
ORS policy. Burgandy himself acknowledges that the legislature can properly require the 
repayment of overpayments caused by fraud, mistake, or administrative error. 
Appellant's Brief at 11. Regardless of cause, recipients are responsible for the repayment 
of any overpayment of assistance. Utah Code Ann. § 3 5 A-1-502 (2) (1997). (Addendum 
A) 
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definition of overpayments to a finite number of categories that may be recovered. The 
term overpayment is statutorily defined and the agency is not granted authority to limit 
that definition in policy. The plain language of the statute contemplates recovery of "any 
thing of value" which the recipient was not eligible to receive. Utah Code Ann. § 35A-1-
502(1 )(b)(i) (1998). Burgandy concedes that the definition is broad enough to include 
benefits paid to him pending his fair hearing. Appellant's Brief at 8. 
II SECTION 35A-1-502 AND THE STATUTORY SCHEME FOR 
COLLECTION OF OVERPAYMENTS PROVIDE REASONABLE 
ACCESS TO JUDICIAL REVIEW AND DO NOT VIOLATE ARTICLE I, 
SECTION 11 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
Article I, section 11 of the Utah Constitution provides: 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done 
to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy 
by due course of law, which shall be administered without 
denial or unnecessary delay, and no person shall be barred 
from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this 
State, by himself or counsel any civil cause to which he is a 
party. 
Utah Const, art. I, section 11. This provision is also referred to as the "open courts" 
provision. Its purpose is to assure access to the courts and an equitable judicial 
procedure. Berrv ex rel. Berry v. Beech Aircraft. 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985). The Utah 
Supreme Court has determined that article I, section 11 "establishes that the framers of 
the Constitution intended that an individual could not be arbitrarily deprived of effective 
remedies designed to protect basic individual rights." Id at 675. Further, the Utah 
10 
Supreme Court has noted that the right to access the judicial system to seek remedy for 
injuries was not meant to be an "empty gesture/* Id While the legislature has power to 
modernize by eliminating or creating laws and rights 
[t]he basic purpose of Article I, section IK however, is to 
impose some limitation on that power since those persons 
who are injured in their persons, property, or reputations are 
generally isolated in society, belong to no identifiable group, 
and rarely are able to rally the political process to their aid. 
Id. at 676. Thus, article 1, section 11 ensures that Utah citizens have a means of redress 
for injury. 
It is unclear which right Burgandy alleges the statute burdens: the right to an 
administrative fair hearing on eligibility only; the right to judicial access in reviewing that 
decision; or the combined administrative and judicial review process as a whole. To the 
extent he argues that the impaired right is that to an administrative hearing, Utah courts 
have not addressed whether a state constitutional guarantee of access to the courts applies 
to a challenge of burdening access to the administrative process. To the extent he argues 
that the impaired right is the right of access to the courts, or to the judicial and 
administrative process as a whole, reasonable access to both exists. 
A. Possible repayment by an ineligible recipient of benefits paid 
pending a fair hearing does not unreasonably deny access to judicial 
review. 
Section 35A-1-502 provides a means for citizens to challenge actions which result 
from its enforcement. The statute itself defines an overpayment, requires it to be repaid, 
11 
and addresses the conditions in which civil penalties are incurred. Standing alone, it 
neither advances nor restricts remedies available to the recipient who feels that he has 
incurred an overpayment in error. However, statutory and administrative procedures are 
in place that allow challenge of eligibility for public assistance benefits and recovery of 
overpayments. 
Burgandy is provided an opportunity to challenge his eligibility determination in 
an administrative setting, with access to judicial review of that decision. Any recipient 
who disagrees with an agency determination of ineligibility may request a fair hearing to 
contest it. Utah-DHS-OFS Volume II Section 190. If unsuccessful, the recipient may 
seek review by the Office of Administrative Hearings or in the district courts. Utah-
DHS-OFS Volume II Section 190-9 (2). 
Similarly, Burgandy is provided with an effective and reasonable remedy for 
challenging the establishment and collection of overpayments. The Office of Recovery 
Services establishes overpayments through an adjudicative proceeding as set forth in the 
Utah Administrative Procedures Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-46b-0.5 to -22 (1997). Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 62A-11-202, -203 (1997). An informal hearing is conducted and a 
decision is issued by the Presiding Officer. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-5(l)(i) (1997). A 
recipient has a right to request reconsideration of that decision on an administrative level 
or pursue judicial review. Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-46b-13, -15 (1997). 
Section 35A-1-502 combined with policy and additional statutory provisions 
12 
provides recipients access to remedy throught both administrative and judicial processes. 
1. The Berry analysis is inapplicable because the statute 
does not abrogate the individual's right to access the 
judicial system and seek redress of an injury. 
Repayment of continued benefits is not an unreasonable bar to judicial review. 
Although Burgandy devotes much time to arguing that continued benefits should be 
analyzed under a heightened standard of review using the two-part test set out by the Utah 
Supreme Court in Berry ex rel. Berry v. Beech Aircraft, the Berry test is not applicable to 
an analysis of section 35A-1-502. The proper inquiry is whether the potential repayment 
of benefits received pending an unsuccessful eligibility challenge unreasonably bars 
judicial access. See Jensen v. Utah State Tax Comm'n. 835 P.2d 965 (Utah 1992). 
The test set forth in Berry, and subsequent cases, is applied when a statute seeks, 
on its face, to limit or abrogate a remedy in the courts. In Berry, the plaintiff brought a 
wrongful death suit on behalf of herself and her children for the death of her husband who 
died in a plane crash. Berry. 717 P.2d at 671. The Utah Product Liability Statute of 
Repose eliminated all causes of action connected with the initial purchase and 
manufacture of a product after a specific time period, thereafter barring the action. The 
Utah Supreme Court used a two-part analysis to determine whether this abrogation of 
access to the courts was constitutional: 
First, section 11 is satisfied if the law provides an injured 
person an effective and reasonable alternative remedy "by the 
course of law" for vindication of his constitutional interest. 
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The benefit provided by the substitute must be substantially 
equal in value or other benefit to the remedy abrogated in 
providing essentially comparable substantive protection to 
one's person, property, or reputation, although the form of the 
substitute remedy may be different. 
Id. at 680. 
Second, if there is no substitute or alternative remedy 
provided, abrogation of the remedy or cause of action may be 
justified only if there is a clear social or economic evil to be 
eliminated and the elimination of an existing legal remedy is 
not an arbitrary or unreasonable means for achieving the 
objective. 
Id. Hence, Berry is utilized when a statute limits or abrogates the right to seek a judicial 
remedy. In such a circumstance, the court must determine if a reasonable alternative to 
bringing legal action exists, or if the abrogation of such a remedy is a reasonable means 
of eliminating a social or economic evil.6 This is not the case in Burgandy's situation. 
Unlike the statute reviewed in Berry, section 35A-1-502 does not eliminate access 
to the court for contesting an eligibility determination or an overpayment. As shown, 
6The analysis applied in Berry has been used in subsequent Utah cases where a 
statutory provision facially limited the plaintiffs access to the courts or to recover fully. 
See generally Ross v. ShackeL 920 P.2d 1159 (Utah 1996) (holding that Governmental 
Immunity Act as applied to a prison doctor did not violate open courts provision because 
there was no abrogation of a common law right); Horton v. Goldminers Daughter. 785 
P.2d 1087 (Utah 1989) (holding that a Utah architects and builders Statute of Repose 
violated the open courts provision); Condemarin v. University Hospital. 775 P.2d 348, 
(Utah 1989), (holding that a recovery limits statute, as applied to University Hospital, 
violated Article I, section 11); Currier v. Holden.862 P.2d 1357 (Utah App. 1993) 
(holding that a 90-day statute of limitations was an unreasonable limitation on a 
prisoner's right to petition for habeas corpus). 
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both the processes for challenging program eligibility and the overpayment recovery 
process itself provide access to administrative and judicial avenues of review, which 
Burgandy has used and continues to use in this very appeal. As access to these processes 
is neither limited nor abrogated, the Berry test is inapplicable. 
Burgandy's argument, although confusing, is not that the right to access the courts 
is abrogated. Instead, he argues that the possibility of repaying benefits received pending 
the outcome of the hearing has such a chilling effect on his right to access the system that, 
as a practical matter, it is a bar to that access. This argument is more closely aligned to 
that raised in Jensen v. Tax Comm'n and its ensuing cases. 
2. The proper inquiry is whether or not an unreasonable 
denial of access to judicial review exists. 
Jensen v. Tax Commission, and several cases which followed it, dealt with the 
question of whether or not certain requirements or pre-conditions, such as pre-payment of 
a fee, constituted a sufficient deterrent to accessing the court as to violate article I, section 
11. In Jensen, the plaintiffs, like Burgandy, had administrative and judicial review 
processes available to them for redress of their claim. They asserted, however, that the 
requirement that a taxpayer seeking judicial review must deposit the full amount of the 
challenged taxes, interest, and penalties with the Tax Commission was in effect a bar to 
accessing the available judicial review. 
The Utah Supreme Court found that the statutory requirement, as applied to the 
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plaintiffs, precluded reasonable access to the couns. thereby violating article I, section 11 
of the Utah Constitution. Jensen. 835 P.2d at 969. The court noted, however, that the 
statutory requirements are not unconstitutional in all cases. If a taxpayer were able to 
meet the deposit requirements, the deposit should be made. Id. 
The court revisited the issue in Maryboy v. Utah State Tax Commission. 904 P.2d 
662 (Utah 1995). Like the taxpayers in Jensen, the Maryboys alleged that prepayment of 
the tax, interest and penalties barred their right to judicial review. In this instance, 
however, it had been determined that the taxpayers had sufficient assets to prepay the tax 
and penalties. While doing so might inconvenience them, it did not deny them reasonable 
access to the court, id. 
Likewise, this Court adopted the same reasoning in Hansen v. Wilkinson. 889 P.2d 
927 (Utah App. 1995). Hansen, a prisoner, argued that payment of a filing fee was 
indistinguishable from the burden placed on the petitioner in Currier v. Holden. 862 P.2d 
1357 (Utah App. 1993) where this Court held that a 90-day statute of limitations was an 
unreasonable limitation on the right to petition for habeas corpus. The Court found the 
argument to be without merit because the statute requiring a prisoner to pay a filing fee 
did not unreasonably limit his right to petition for extraordinary relief. Id. 
Admittedly, Burgandy's situation differs from that of these other plaintiffs. These 
cases deal with accessing the court, not the administrative system, and with a pre-
condition rather than a possible repayment. However, Burgandy, like the plaintiffs in 
16 
Jensen, Maryboy. and Hansen, has an avenue for redress available but contends that his 
ability to access the system is somehow burdened. 
The correct question to be decided by the Court under this Jensen type scenario, is 
whether the possibility of repayment of continued benefits unreasonably burdens access 
to judicial review. Under a Jensen analysis, it does not. 
3. There is no unreasonable denial of access to the courts. 
The possibility that Burgandy may be determined ineligible for a program and may 
have to repay benefits received pending that determination in no way bars his access to 
the court. Possible repayment of a benefit to which one is not entitled is distinguishable 
from prepayment of a challenged tax and fine. Burgandy was not required to meet a pre-
condition before requesting his hearing. He paid neither fee, nor the overpayment amount 
in order to request a fair hearing. 
Burgandy analogizes his situation to that in Silver v. Cormier, 529 F.2d 161 (10th 
Cir. 1976) in which an urban renewal authority relocation officer threatened to withhold 
$10,000.00 properly owing the plaintiffs should they file a lawsuit on a separate action. 
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that: 
A public official's threats to a citizen to withhold monies due 
and owing, should legal proceedings on an independent 
matter be instituted, burdens or chills constitutional rights of 
access to the courts. And this is true although the threat is not 
actually effective. 
Silver. 529 F.2d at 163. The analogy is incorrect. The State agrees that a threat to hold 
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back money which is legally due and owing would be a bar to accessing the courts. 
However, the State is not threatening to withhold benefits legally due and owing 
Burgandy in order to discourage his challenge of eligibility. It is only attempting to 
collect back benefits for which he was ineligible under the program requirements. 
Burgandy asserts that the only reason this overpayment is incurred is because his 
right to a hearing is exercised. Appellant's Brief at 11. This argument is also without 
merit. The overpayment is incurred because he is not eligible for the benefits he received, 
not because he requested a hearing. If, at hearing, Burgandy had been found eligible for 
the benefits, no overpayment would have been incurred. Further, a recipient like 
Burgandy, who was on notice that the agency considers him ineligible for the assistance 
program, may discontinue benefits pending the hearing so that no overpayment for that 
time period occurs should he not prevail. 
As previously discussed, individuals determined ineligible for public assistance are 
entitled to a hearing before those benefits cease. Goldberg. 397 U.S. at 267. The fair 
hearing with continuation of benefits pending the decision protects the due process right 
established in Goldberg and allows an individual to have a means of support in case there 
has been a misapplication of policy in determining ineligibility. However, Goldberg 
guarantees Burgandy due process before his benefits are terminated. It does not establish 
a substantive right to benefits for which he was never eligible. 
Burgandy5s theory, followed to its logical conclusion, would require the state to 
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provide benefits to a recipient regardless of eligibility. There is no support for this in 
Utah constitutional provisions, statutes, or case law. It is illogical that a recipient would 
be entitled to benefits issued solely because he requested a hearing when he did not meet 
the underlying eligibility requirements for them. 
Burgandy contends that the "threat of repayment," although not a retaliatory action 
by the state, has the same effect — it will chill a citizen from exercising his right to access 
the court. Appellant's Brief at 24. Although Burgandy continually refers to the 
repayment of these benefits as a threat, that is not so. There is no threat. The probability 
of paying back something to which you were never entitled if you are the losing party is 
inherent in many civil actions. It is not considered a bar to accessing administrative or 
judicial remedies. 
III. THE ELIGIBILITY RULES AND POLICIES ADOPTED BY THE 
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION DO NOT APPLY TO THE 
STATE FUNDED GENERAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM. 
Burgandy expends considerable time and effort exhorting the court to consider 
how the Social Security program is run and urging that the General Assistance program 
be run in the same way. He suggests that the GA Program adopt Social Security's policy 
of waiving repayment of benefits accrued pending a hearing if the recipient challenged 
the agency's action in good faith. However, the alternatives offered represent decisions 
to be made in the legislative and policy-making arenas. 
The fact that Burgandy was ultimately eligible for benefits under the Social 
19 
Security program and that the federal agency applies a different policy for recovery of 
benefits paid pending the outcome of a hearing is not relevant to the issue on appeal here. 
The policy alternative Burgandy offers does not go to the question of constitutionality and 
access to the court and is, therefore, not an issue properly before the court. 
Different programs have different rules. Regardless of what federal law or policy 
allows, there is no corresponding state statute or policy excusing recovery of 
overpayments when the recipient appeals an ineligibility determination in good faith. 
Utah law requires recovery of all overpayments regardless of fault. Utah Code Ann. § 
35A-1-502(2)(1997). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Department of Human Services urges this Court to 
affirm the decision of the trial court which held that Utah Code Ann. § 35A-1-502 does 
not violate article I, section 11 of the Utah Constitution, and, therefore, the administrative 
decision awarding the State of Utah an overpayment in the amount of $726 is correct. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS o) 1 DAY OF JANUARY, 1999 
Ann 
Assistant Attorney General 
Karma K. Dixon 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Appellee 
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DECLARATION OF RIGHTS Art. I, § 11 
Utah State Constitution, 1986 Utah L. Rev. 
319. 
Recent Developments in Utah Law — Judi-
cial Decisions — Criminal Law, 1988 Utah L. 
Rev. 177. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 47 Am. Jur. 2d Jury § 7 et 
seq. 
C.J.S. — 50 C.J.S. Juries § 9 et seq. 
A.L.R. — Driving while intoxicated or simi-
lar offense, right to trial by jury in criminal 
prosecution for, 16 A.L.R.3d 1373. 
Right in equity suit to jury trial of counter-
claim involving legal issue, 17 A.L.R.3d 1321. 
Issues in garnishment as triable to court or 
to jury, 19 A.L.R.3d 1393. 
Automobiles: validity and construction of 
legislation authorizing revocation or suspen-
ANALVSIS 
Action under Civil Rights Act of 1871. 
Actions by court. 
Actions by state. 





—Suspension of execution of death sentence. 
Debt collection. 
District court jurisdiction. 
Election contest. 
Forum non conveniens. 
Injury or damage to property. 
Intoxicating liquor. 
Land Registration Act. 
Limitations. 
—Limitations of actions. 
—Statutory limitation of review. 
Occupational disease law. 
Sovereign immunity. 
Torts. 
—Action by wife against husband. 
—Lass of consortium. 
Unlicensed law practice. 
Waiver of rights. 
Workmen's compensation law. 
Cited. 
\ sion of operator's license for ''habitual," "per-
sistent," or "frequent" violations of traffic reg-
 ulations, 48 A.L.R.4th 367. 
<• Jury trial waiver as binding on later state 
civil trial, 48 A.L.R.4th 747. 
* Paternity proceedings: right to jury trial, 51 
A.L.R.4th 565. 
Right to jury trial in action for retaliatory 
" discharge from employment, 52 A.L.R.4th 
1
 1141. 
Right to jury trial in state court divorce pro-
ceedings, 56 A.L.R.4th 955. 
r Jury trial rights in, and on appeal from, 
small claims court proceeding, 70 A.L.R.4th 
lf 1119. 
Key Numbers. — Jury «=» 9 et seq. 
Action under Civil Rights Act of 1871. 
Jurisdiction over actions brought under the 
Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. 1981 et 
seq., is vested originally in the federal courts, 
but the exercise of concurrent jurisdiction by 
state courts is not thereby prohibited; in view 
of the provisions of this section, therefore, it 
was error for trial court to dismiss for lack of 
jurisdiction otherwise proper action brought 
under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Kish v. Wright, 562 P.2d 
625 (Utah 1977). 
Trial court would not err in dismissing ac-
tion brought under 42 U.S.C. 1983 on the 
ground of forum non conveniens in a proper 
case, but such dismissal should be without 
prejudice so that the plaintiff might move his 
suit to another forum without harm to his 
claim. Kish v. Wright, 562 P.2d 625 (Utah 
1977). 
Actions by court 
Court of equity has jurisdiction to open pro-
bate proceeding and to proceed against bond of 
administratrix where she has practiced extrin-
sic fraud on the court. Weyant v. Utah Sav. & 
Trust Co., 54 Utah 181, 182 P. 189, 9 AJLJL 
1119 (1919). 
Actions by state. 
This section did not alter the law with re-
spect to certain rights which are vested in the 
Sec. 11. [Courts open — Redress of injuries.] 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his 
person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which 
shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person 
shall be barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this 
State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party. 
History: Const. 1896. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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35A-1-502 UTAH WORKFORCE SERVICES CODE 
"Chapter 8, Employment Support Act" was 
changed to "Chapter 3, Employment Support 
Act" pursuant to Laws 1997, ch. 375, § 329. 
35A-1-502. Civil liability for overpayment. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Intentionally, knowingly, and recklessly" mean the same as those 
terms are defined in Section 76-2-103. 
(b) (i) "Overpayment" means money, public assistance, or any other 
thing of value provided under a state or federally funded benefit 
program to the extent that the person receiving the thing of value is 
not entitled to receive it or is not entitled to receive it at the level-
provided. 
(ii) "Overpayment" includes money paid to a provider under this 
title in connection with public assistance; Title 62A, Chapter 11, Part 
3, Public Support of Children; Title 78, Chapter 45, Uniform Civil 
Liability for Support Act; Title 78, Chapter 45a, Uniform Act on 
Paternity; or any other publicly funded assistance benefit program to 
the extent that the provider receives payment: 
(A) for goods or services not provided; or 
(B) in excess of the amount to which the provider is entitled. 
(c) "Provider" means the same as that term is defined in Section 
62A-1M03. 
(2) Each provider, client, or other person who receives an overpayment 
shall, regardless of fault, return the overpayment or repay its value to the 
department immediately: 
(a) upon receiving written notice of the overpayment from the depart-
ment; or 
(b) upon discovering the overpayment, if that occurs prior to receiving 
notice. 
(3) (a) Except as provided under Subsection (3)(b), interest on the 
unreturned balance of the overpayment shall accrue at the rate of 10% a 
year until an administrative or judicial judgment is entered. 
(b) If the overpayment was not the fault of the person receiving it, that 
person is not liable for interest on the unreturned balance. 
(c) In accordance with rules adopted by the department, an overpay-
ment may be recovered through deductions from cash assistance, general 
assistance, food stamps, or other cash-related assistance provided to a 
client under Chapter 3, Employment Support Act. 
(4) Each person who knowingly assists a client, provider, or other person in 
obtaining an overpayment is jointly and severally liable for the overpayment. 
(5) (a) In proving liability for overpayment under this section or Subsection 
62A-ll-204.1(2)(a)(i) when fault is alleged, the department shall prove by 
clear and convincing evidence that the overpayment was obtained inten-
tionally, knowingly, recklessly, by false statement, misrepresentation, 
impersonation, or other fraudulent means, such as by committing any of 
the acts or omissions described in Sections 76-8-1203 through 76-8-1205. 
(b) If fault is established under Subsection (5)(a), any person who 
obtained or helped another obtain an overpayment shall be subject to: 
(i) a civil penalty of 10% of the amount of the overpayment; and 
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(n) disqualification from receiving public assistance for 12 months 
for the first offense, 24 months for the second offense, and perma-
nently for the third offense or as otherwise provided by federal law. 
(6) (a) If an action is filed, the department may recover, in addition to the 
principal sum plus interest, reasonable attorneys' fees and costs unless the 
repayment obligation arose from an administrative error by the division. 
(b) Upon receipt, the department shall forward attorneys' fees recov-
ered under Subsection (6)(a) to the attorney general's office or the county 
attorney's office that litigated the matter. 
(7) If a court finds that funds or benefits were secured, in whole or part, by 
fraud by the person from whom repayment is sought, the court shall assess an 
additional sum as considered appropriate as punitive damages up to the 
amount of repayment being sought 
History: C. 1953, 62A-9-129, enacted by L. tance" for "this chapter" and "assistance" for 
1994, ch. 122, ^ 2; renumbered by L. 1997, "entitlement," inserted "Title 62A " and deleted 
ch. 174, § 7. "of this Title" after "Children" in Subsection 
Repeals and Reenactments . — Laws (l)(b)(ii) substituted "client" for "recipient" in 
1994 ch 122, § 2 repeals former § 62A-9-129 Subsections (2) and (4), added Subsections 
as enacted by Laws 1988, ch 1, § 246 requir (3)(c), (5)(b), (5)(b)(n) (6) and (7) deleted "shall 
ing repayment of benefits improperly received be imposed on each person who obtained or 
and enacts the present section effective March helped another obtain an overpayment by any 
16 1994 of these means" after overpayment" in Subsec-
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amend
 t l o n (5)(D)(i), and made stylistic changes 
ment effective July 1 1997 renumbered this Compiler's Notes . - The reference to 
section which former y appeared as § 62A-9 "Chapter 8, Employment Support Act" in Sub-
129 deleted medical or other benefit food
 s e c t ion (3)(c) was changed to "Chapter 3, Em-
stamps after assistance and entitlement „ i _ _
 + c ~_+ \„+» „ f^T„ ,»o iQQ7 
„*«. «r™i~i» ,., C . , K ™ . ™ M V U . „ „ U - , ployment Support Act pursuant to Laws 1997, after "funded" in Subsection (l)(b)(i) substi 
tuted "this title in connection with public assis- ch 375, § 329 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Estoppel. to recover the value of a food stamp 
Former section did not clearly operate as an ovenssuance from him Mendez v Utah Dept 
anti-estoppel provision, and a recipient could of Social Servs 813 P2d 1234 (Utah Ct App 
raise an equitable estoppel defense against 1991) 
efforts by the Department of Human Services 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 79 Am Jur 2d Welfare Laws C.J.S. — 81 C J S Social Security and Public 
§§ 24 5 91, 93 to 104 Welfare §§ 17, 122, 138 
35A-1-503. Evidence in legal actions. 
In any civil action pursuant to this part. 
(1) A fund transfer or payment instrument made to the order of a party 
shall constitute prima facie evidence that such party received cash 
assistance under Chapter 3, Employment Support Act, from the state. 
(2) In any civil or criminal action pursuant to this part, all of the records 
in the custody of the department relating to the application for, verifica-
tion of, issuance of, receipt of, and use of public assistance shall constitute 
business records within the meaning of the exceptions to the hearsay rule 
of evidence. 
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62A-9-126 HUMAN SERVICES CODE 
62A-9-126. Enforcement of provisions — County attorney 
or district attorney — Attorney general. 
At the request of the office, it is the duty of the county attorney or district 
attorney, as appropriate under Sections 17-18-1, 17-18-1.5, and 17-18-1.7, and 
the attorney general to represent the office in any legal action taken under this 
chapter or under Title 76, Chapter 8, Part 12, Public Assistance Fraud. 
History: C. 1953,62A-9-126, enacted by L. ment, effective March 16, 1994, rewrote the, 
1988, ch. 1, § 243; 1993, ch. 38, § 66; 1994, section to such an extent that a detailed anal-, 
ch. 122, § 1. ysis is impracticable. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend-
62A-9-127, 62A-9-128. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Laws 1994, ch. 122, § 15 repeals report additional income and prohibiting spec-
§§ 62A-9-127 and 62A-9-128, as last amended ified fraudulent activities, effective March 16f> 
by Laws 1988, ch. 242, § 26 and as enacted by 1994. For criminal provisions on public assis-
Laws 1988, ch. 1, § 245, imposing a duty to tance fraud, see § 76-8-1201 et seq. 
62A-9-129. Civil liability for overpayment. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Intentionally, knowingly, and recklessly" mean the same as those 
terms are defined in Section 76-2-103. 
(b) (i) "Overpayment" means money, public assistance, medical or other 
benefit, food stamp, or any other thing of value provided under a state 
or federally funded entitlement benefit program to the extent that the 
person receiving the thing of value is not entitled to receive it, or is not 
entitled to receive it at the level provided. 
(ii) "Overpayment" includes money paid to a provider under this 
chapter; Chapter 11, Par t 3, Public Support of Children, of this title; 
Title 78, Chapter 45, Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act; Title 78, 
Chapter 45a, Uniform Act on Paternity; or any other publicly funded 
-entitlement benefit program to the extent that the provider receives 
payment for goods or services not provided or payment in excess of the 
amount to which the provider is entitled. '1 
(c) "Provider" means the same as that term is defined in Section 
62A-11-103. ?1 
(2) Each provider, recipient, or other person who receives an overpayment 
shall, regardless of fault, re turn the overpayment or repay its value to the. 
department immediately:
 r'$ 
(a) upon receiving written notice of the overpayment from the depart-
ment; or ^ 
(b) upon discovering the overpayment, if that occurs prior to receiving 
notice. *!f 
(3) (a) Except as provided under Subsection (b), interest on the unreturned 
balance of the overpayment accrues at the rate of 10% a year until an 
administrative or judicial judgment is entered. ftjj 
(b) If the overpayment was not the fault of the person receiving it, tha^ 
person is not liable for interest on the unreturned balance. 
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(4) Each person who knowingly assists a recipient, provider, or other person 
in obtaining an overpayment is jointly and severally liable for the overpay-
ment. 
(5) In proving liability for overpayment under this section or Subsection 
62A-ll-204.1(2)(a)(i) when fault is alleged, the department shall prove by clear 
and convincing evidence that the overpayment was obtained intentionally, 
knowingly, recklessly, by false statement, misrepresentation, impersonation, 
or other fraudulent means, such as by committing any of the acts or omissions 
described in Sections 76-8-1203 through 76-8-1205. A civil penalty of 10% of 
the amount of the overpayment shall be imposed on each person who obtained 
or helped another obtain an overpayment by any of these means. 
History: C. 1953,62A-9-129, enacted by L. as enacted by Laws 1988, ch. 1, § 246, requir-
1994, ch. 122, § 2. ing repayment of benefits improperly received, 
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws and enacts the present section, effective March 
1994, ch. 122, § 2 repeals former § 62A-9-129, 16, 1994. 
62A-9-130. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Laws 1994, ch. 122, § 15 repeals activities, effective March 16, 1994. For crimi-
§ 62A-9-130, as last amended by Laws 1990, nal provisions on public assistance fraud, see 
ch. 175, § 1, prohibiting vanous fraudulent § 76-8-1201 et seq. 
62A-9-131. Legal actions — Evidence — Value of benefits. 
In any civil action pursuant to this chapter: 
(1) A paid state warrant made to the order of a party shall constitute 
prima facie evidence that such party received financial assistance from the 
state. 
(2) In any civil or criminal action pursuant to this chapter, all of the 
records in the custody of the department relating to the application for, 
verification of, issuance of, receipt of, and use of public assistance shall 
constitute business records within the meaning of the exceptions to the 
hearsay rule of evidence. 
(3) In any civil or criminal action pursuant to this chapter, the value of 
the benefits received shall be based on the ordinary or usual charge for 
similar benefits in the private sector. 
. History: C. 1953,62A-9-131, enacted by L. criminal" after "any civil" in the first sentence, 
1988, ch. 1, § 248; 1994, ch. 122, § 3. deleted former Subsection (4), providing that 
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend- repayment is not a defense in a criminal action, 
ment, effective March 16, 1994, deleted "or and made stylistic changes. 
62A-9-134. County attorney and attorney general respon-
sibilities. 
It is the duty of each county attorney, as appropriate under Sections 17-18-1, 
17-18-1.5, and 17-18-1.7, and the attorney general to carry out the mandates 
set forth in this chapter. 
History: C. 1953,62A-9-134, enacted by L. Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend-
1988, ch. 1, § 251; 1993, ch. 38, § 67; 1994, ment, effective March 16, 1994, deleted "dis-
ch. 122, § 4. trict attorney" after "county attorney." 
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355 EMPLOYMENT DEVELOPMENT R986-218-810 (10/97) 
R986-218. Financial Assistance General Assis-
tance/Self-Sufficiency Program. 
R986-218-800. Incorporation by Reference. 
R986-218-801. Authority. 
R986-218-802. Description. 
R986-218-810. Program Standards. 
R986-218-820. Income Standards, Eligibility and Grant 
Determination. 
R986-218-830. Assets. 
R986-218-840. GA Medical Benefit. 
R986-218-850. Reviews. 
R986-218-860. Special General Assistance Program For 
Transient Persons. 
R986-218-800. Incorporation by Reference . 
Unless otherwise indicated, all references to 45 CFR 
refer to the Code of Federal Regulations, 45, Par ts 200 
through 499, revised as of October 1, 1990. All referenced 
Federal Regulation are available for public review at the 
Division of Employment Development, 140 Eas t 300 South, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103. 
R986-218-801. Authority. 
The department requires compliance with U.C. 62A-9-
114. 
R986-218-802. Description. 
1. The General Assistance Self-Sufficiency Program 
(GASSP) provides temporary cash assistance to single 
persons and couples while they are overcoming the condi-
tion making them unemployable or while they are qualify-
ing for SSI. The GASSP Program provides financial assis-
tance on a short term basis while participants are involved 
in medical and/or mental health t reatment to overcome the 
limitations keeping them from employment. 
2. The program is based on the concept of mutual 
responsibility. The client has the responsibility to make 
efforts to overcome the condition making him unemploy-
able and to move towards self-sufficiency or to qualify for 
other benefits. 
3. Less capable clients will receive special help from 
department staff in applying for these other benefits and 
participating in Self-Sufficiency activities. 
4. Department staff have the responsibility to assist 
clients in becoming self-sufficient and in securing other 
benefits. 
5. To qualify, individuals must: 
a. Be at least 18 years old or emancipated. 
b. Be unemployable because of a medical or psychological 
problem or they must be unable to work at a job at least 23 
hours weekly at minimum wage (gainful employment of 
$500 per month). 
c. Participate in rehabilitation and employment services 
and follow through on efforts to qualify for other benefits 
for which they may be eligible. This includes SSI, Social 
Security Disability, Veterans Benefits, Workers' Compen-
sation. 
6. A person eligible for Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) 
assistance is not eligible for GASSP 
7. AFDC rules R986-211 through R986-215 apply unless 
a different rule is stated below. 
R986-218-810. Program Standards. 
1. The following definitions apply to this section: 
a. "Bona fide offer of employment" means an offer of 
employment was given and was.made in good faith. 
b. "Good cause for refusing employment" means a defi-
nite job offer was not made; the wages did not meet 
minimum wage requirements; the employment was a risk 
to the health or safety of the worker; the employment 
lacked workmen's compensation benefits; the position of-
fered is vacant due to a strike, lockout or other bona fide 
labor dispute; or the individual is unable to work for 
physical reasons or for lack of transportation. 
2. Age and Factually Emancipated Child: 
a. The individual must be at least eighteen years of age 
or emancipated. 
b. A person who is not legally emancipated may claim to 
be factually emancipated. He must live independently from 
his parents or guardian and have been economically self-
supporting for the past six months. 
c. If the parents are available the local department office 
shall contact them. 
i. The child is ineligible if the parents will support him. 
ii. If the parents refuse to support the child or are 
unavailable, child support enforcement procedures must 
be followed. 
iii. If the applicant refuses without good cause to coop-
erate in locating the parents , he is ineligible. 
3. Determination of Employability: 
A person must work less than 100 hours per month and 
must meet one of the following three criteria: 
i. Unemployable, or 
or 
ii. 60 years of age or older. 
4. Unemployable: 
a. The applicant must provide medical evidence that he 
is not employable due to a physical or mental impairment. 
The impairment must be so severe that the person cannot 
do his previous work. In addition, he could not reasonably 
hope to find any other kind of "substantial work" consider-
ing his age, education, and work experience. "Substantial 
work" is work paying $500 or more a month. 
b. The local department office may accept a physician's 
statement, a licensed/certified psychologist statement, a 
Utah Medical Assistance Program statement, or a state-
ment from another agency involved in disability determi-
nation, such as, the Veterans Administration or the Divi-
sion of Rehabilitation Services. The local department office 
may require a second opinion by a specific person or 
agency. The cost of a physical examination will be paid by 
the local department office. 
i. If the medical report says the client can work with no 
limitations or that the limitations will last less than 30 
days from the date of the onset of the physical or mental 
impairment, the case will be denied. 
ii. If the medical report indicates the applicant is unable 
to work for 30 days or more from the date of the onset of 
physical or mental impairment, he is considered unemploy-
able. 
iii. If limitations supported by medical evidence prevent 
the applicant from participating in his previous line oi 
work and he cannot reasonably hope to find any other 
work, he is considered unemployable. 
iv. If the available medical/psychological data is incom-
plete or conflicting, a regional department director's policy 
decision may be used to establish employable/unemploy-
able. This decision must be documented based on available 
medical/psychological data and case history. 
v. If the illness or incapacity may last longer than a year, 
then the person must apply for SSDI/SSI benefits. 
5. Emergency Work Program Alternative: 
When open to singles and couples, the EWP can be an 
alternative to the GA Self-Sufficiency program for some 
clients. The client must be able to meet the EWP 40 hour a 
week performance requirement. The 40 hours performance 
requirement could be a combination of participation at the 
work site, medical/mental health t reatment and job search. 
6. Self-Sufficiency: 
a. All GA applicants and their spouses, at time of 
application, and recipients at time of review, must be 
interviewed by a GA self-sufficiency worker and complete a 
self-sufficiency plan unless exempted. If a recipient at 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
T. TRON BURGUNDY aka Ronald ) 




STATE OF UTAH, Department ) 
of Human Services, Office of 
Recovery Services 
Respondent. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. 970903742AA 
Judae Parley R. Baldwin 
The foregoing matter came before the court for trial on 
December 18, 1997 on Petitioner's complaint for de novo review of 
the Findings and Order issued by the Department of Human 
Services, Office of Administrative Hearings en May 8, 1997. The 
Honorable Parley R. Baldwin presided. The petitioner, T. Tron 
Burgundy was represented by Michael E. Bulson. The Respondent 
State of Utah was represented by Frank D. Mylar, Assistant 
131 
Attorney General. At the hearing, the Court accepted the 
Stipulation of Material Facts executed and filed by the parties. 
Petitioner submitted an Affidavit with his Reply to Trial Brief 
filed with the permission of the court after the trial. 
The Court having reviewed the file, heard the arguments of 
the parties and having fully considered the record in this matter 
enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
Pursuant to the stipulation of material facts submitted by 
the parties, the court finas that: 
1. Petitioner T. Tron Burgundy began receiving General 
Welfare Assistance GA) from tne State of Utah in May, 1994, 
cased upon a determination mat ne was unempioyaole. 
2. On June, ", 1994, while receiving GA benefits, 
Petitioner applied for disability benefits under the federal 
Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) and Supplemental 
Security Income (SSI) programs. 
3. On July 21, 1994, Petitioner received notice from the 
Ogden Office of Family Support that he was no longer considered 
unemployable and that his GA would terminate on July 31, 1994. 
2 
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4. On or about August 1, 1994, Petitioner requested a Fair 
Hearing on the decision to terminate his benefits and he 
requested that his GA benefits continue while his hearing request 
was pending. 
5. On August 16, 1994, Petitioner's case was heard before 
Fair Hearing Officer Neal Bernson. At this hearing, Petitioner 
had the opportunity to suomit evidence, question and call 
witnesses, present argument, ana be represented by counsel. 
6. On October 6, 1994, the Fair Hearing Officer issued a 
decision sustaining the closure of Petitioner's GA case. 
7. Petitioner requested a review of the Fair Hearing 
Officer's decision. 
8. On or about January c, 1995, the Director of the 
Office of Administrative Hearing closed the record of review on 
the Fair Hearing decision after receiving memoranda from all 
parties . 
9. On April 1, 1995, the Office of Recovery Services 
served a Notice of Agency Action: Overpayment Determination 
(NAA:OD) on Petitioner, alleging an overpayment in the amount of 
$726.00 for GA benefits paid while his Fair Hearing decision was 
pending. 
1 oc 1 *J ~ 
10. Petitioner timely requested a review of this agency 
action on April 6, 1995. However, that hearing was stayed until 
the final agency action on the eligibility appeal was rendered. 
11. On July 20, 1995, Petitioner was found by the Social 
Security Administration to be disabled under the SSDI and SSI 
programs, with the disability commencing in September, 1993. 
12. On November 12, 1996, the Director of the Office of 
Administrative Hearings affirmed the Fair Hearing Officer's 
eligibility decision finding petitioner not eligible for GA 
benefits. Petitioner did not appeal .this eligibility decision. 
13. On March 10, 1997, a hearing was held before an 
Administrative Law Judge on the overpayment alleged in the 
NAA:OD. 
14. On May 8, 1997, the Administrative Law Judge issued 
her final agency decision on the overpayment determination. 
As allowed by the court the following facts were submitted 
to the court in Petitioner's Affidavit attached to his Response 
to Defendant's Trial Brief: 
15. In July 1994, Petitioner was 56 years of age and was 
suffering from physical and mental impairments. 
16. When he received a notice of termination of GA 
4 
benefits, petitioner was homeless, unable to work and had no 
savings, assets or other means of support himself. 
17. At the time Petitioner requested a hearing on the 
termination of his GA assistance, he believed he was entitled to 
GA because he was disabled. 
18. Several months after being terminated from GA benefits, 
petitioner reapplied for those benefits and was found eligible to 
receive them. 
19. He continued to receive them until he became eligible 
for Social Security Disability benefits. 
Pursuant to the evidence presented at trial, the court finds 
by clear and convincing evidence that: 
20. Petitioner was notified of the decision to terminate 
his GA benefits. 
21. Petitioner requested a Fair Hearing on the decision 
terminating his benefits. 
22. Petitioner elected to continue receiving GA until 
after a decision was issued on the Fair Hearing. 
23. Petitioner was aware that if the decision from the 
Fair Hearing was against him, he would subsequently be 
responsible for the overpayment. 
5 
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Based on the above findings of fact, the Court now makes its 
conclusions of law: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The law requires the petitioner to repay the GA 
benefits he received during the Fair Hearing hearing process if 
he is unsuccessful ar his hearing. See 45 C.F.R. 
§205.10(a)(4)(I)(B), Utah Code Ann. §62A-9-129 and Rule 844-
4(2)(A), Volume II of the Department of Human Services, Office of 
Family Support (UTAH-D.H.S.-O.F.S., Vol. II). 
2. This law is not unconstitutional. 
3. Requiring Petitioner to repay any GA he received 
during a period of ineligibility has no chilling effect on his 
right to access to tne court. 
4. The State has erected no barrier which caused 
Petitioner to lose his right to access the court. 
5. The right to access does not guarantee Petitioner that 
he will prevail. 
6. Petitioner has the right to access the courts whether 
or not he continues to receive GA during the hearing process. 
7. Petitioner's right to due process was not inhibited 
6 
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because he was able to exercise all of his procedural rights by 
contesting the termination of his benefits. 
8. If Petitioner unsuccessfully contests his termination 
of benefits and he elected to continue receiving GA during the 
hearing process, then he is required to repay any general 
assistance he received while ineligible from August, 1994 to 
October, 1994. 
9. The final agency decision should be affirmed. 
10. Petitioner should pay to the State $726.00 for 
general assistance he received during, his period of ineligibility 
DATED this f > day of ^5(A[^ 1998. 
PARLEY R. BALDWIN 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Michael E. Bulson 
Attorney for Petitioner 
7 
u: 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I CERTIFY that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, first-class postage 
prepaid, this LJ day of y< 
, 1998, to: 
MICHAEL E. 3ULS0N, ESQ. 
UTAH LEGAL SERVICES 
550 24TH STREET, SUITE 300 
OGDEN, UT 84401 
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STATE OF UTAH, Department 





Case Mo. 970903742AA 
Judge Parley R. Ealdwin 
The foregoing matter came before the court for trial en 
December 18, 199~ en Petitioner's complaint for ce novo review of 
the Findings and Order issued cy the Department cf Human 
Services, Office of Administrative Hearings on May 8, 1997. The 
Honorable Parley R. Baldwin presided. The petitioner, T. Tron 
Burgundy was represented by Michael E. Bulson. The Respondent 
State of Utah was represented by Frank D. Mylar, Assistant 
Attorney General. 
The Court having reviewed the file, heard arguments made by 
the parties, and having fully considered the record in this 
matter, and having entered its Findinas cf Fact and Conclusions 
of Law, 
HEREBY ORDERS THAT: 
The final agency decision issued en May 8, 1997 is affirmed. 
Petitioner's right to access the courts was not violated. A 
judgment is entered in favor of the the State of Utah, Office of 
Recovery Services and against Petitioner for $726.00 for an 
overpayment of general assistance during the time period he was 
ineligible to receive that assistance from August 1994 to 
October, 1994. Said judgment shall accrue at the judgment rate 
of interest. 
i 
DATED this >> dav cf '3 H-U , 1998. 
( 
PARLEY R. BALDWIN 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Addendum C 
UTAH-DHS-OFS 
VOLUME II 1-92 
GENERAL PROVISIONS - CLIENT RIGHTS 
100 GENERAL PROVISIONS 
110 qj?nt Right? 
Persons who are eligible for financial assistance have the right to receive 
correct and timely benefits. They have the right to receive proper notice if 
there is a change in the amount of benefits for which they qualify. In most 
situations this means notice must be written, adequate and timely. The 
intent behind notice rules is discussed in this section. (See also Sections 
810, 810-1 for more rules about notice.) 
In addition, all people have the right to: 
1. ADDIV for Assistance 
A. Clients may apply or reapply any time for assistance through 
any of our programs. 
B. Any client who needs help from district staff in order to apply, 
has a right to receive that help. 
2. Be Treated with Courtesy 
Clients have the right to be treated with dignity, courtesy and respect. 
This includes, but is not limited to, the following: 
A. Being addressed as Mr., Mrs., Ms., or Miss. 
B. Being told the name of any worker they contact. 
C. Being told clearly and courteously (verbally and in writing) 
which verifications and information he must provide. 
(Continued on Next Page) 
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UTAH-DHS-OFS 
VOLUME II 1-92 
GENERAL PROVISIONS - FAIR HEARINGS 
190 Fair Hearings 
The client has a legal right to ask for a fair hearing any time he does not 
agree with an action on his case. 
Explain the policy and the action when a client questions it. Let him talk to 
your supervisor if he wants. But, if he still wants to ask for a hearing, don't 
try and stop him. Help him fill out a Form 490. He can turn it in to the 
Local Office or the Office of Administrative Hearings. (After a hearing has 
been scheduled, see Section 180-2 and use an agency conference and 
attempt to resolve the issue before the hearing.) 
There are two types of hearings. These are: 
1. In-person Hearings. All parties meet at the same place for the 
hearing. 
2. Telephonic Hearings. The hearing examiner remains in his office and 
conducts the hearing via telephone conference call to one location. 
All other parties who attend the hearing meet in one place for this 
type of hearing. 
The client may choose the type of hearing he wants. The Hearings Office 
will choose the type of hearing for any client who does not indicate which 
type of hearing he would prefer. 
1. The client has to ask for the hearing in writing within 90 days of the 
effective date of the case action with which he disagrees. 
2. The Hearing Examiner will tell the client and the Local Office: the 
time, date, place, and reason for the hearing. Generally he has to mail 
this notice at least ten days before the hearing. But if all parties want 
it sooner, he can hold it sooner. 
3. The client can ask for postponements of the scheduled hearing. 
These postponements cannot exceed a total of 30 days. 
(Continued on Next Page) 





GENERAL PROVISIONS - FAIR HEARINGS 
Postponements of the scheduled hearing will not be granted beyond the 
30 days for any reason. 
4. If the Local Office wants legal counsel, contact the financial policy 
specialist at the State Office of Family Support. The Specialist will 
coordinate legal representation with the Attorney General's office. 
5. Fair Hearings are not open to the public. The only ones that can attend 
are the Hearing Examiner, representatives and witnesses for the 
Departments of Human Services and Health, and representatives 
witnesses, friends, and relatives of the client. The Hearing Examiner can 
limit the number of people at a hearing if there isn't room for everyone. 
6. When a hearing is about a medical issue, the client can get a new 
medical report if he and the Hearing Examiner decide it is necessary. 
The client can choose the medical person he wants to do the new report. 
The Local Office must pay for it if the Hearing Examiner says so. 





GENERAL PROVISIONS - FAIR HEARINGS 
When To Continue Assistance For a Recipient 
190-2 When To Continue Assistance For A Recipient 
1. When the action in question required advance notice, continue the 
financial assistance if the client asked for the hearing anytime before 
the effective date of the action or within 10 days of the notice mail 
date. 
At the hearing, the Hearing Examiner will decide what the issues are. 
If he says the only reason for the hearing is because of Federal or 
State policy or law, stop the financial assistance at that time. 
Otherwise, continue the financial assistance until you receive the 
hearing decision. 
2. When the action in question did not require advance notice, the OFS 
Associate Director decides about continued assistance. If he says 
the only reason for the hearing is because of Federal or State policy 
or law, do not issue continued assistance. However, if he says that 
is not the only reason for the hearing, continue the financial 
assistance if the client asked for the hearing within 10 days of the 
notice mail date. You would then continue the financial assistance 
until you get the hearing decision. 
3. If you continue the financial assistance when the hearing is because 
the client does not agree with the amount of an overpayment, 
continue the grant minus the recovery amount. However, if you 
continue the financial assistance when the hearing is about whether 
or not an overpayment exists in the first place, reinstate the original 
grant amount. 
4. The client is not entitled to continued assistance pending any appeal 
of the initial hearing decision. 
(Continued on Next Page) 





GENERAL PROVISIONS - FAIR HEARINGS 
When To Stop Continued Assistance For A Recipient 
A. When to Stop Continued Assistance for a Recipient 
1. If the client requests the assistance be stopped. The 
request must be made in writing. 
2. If the Hearing Examiner states, in writing, the only 
reason for the hearing is because of Federal or State 
policy or law, stop the financial assistance at that time. 
Otherwise, continue the financial assistance until you 
receive the hearing decision. 
190-2 Page 2 
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840 Incorrect Payments 
An incorrect payment occurs when a person either: 
1. Receives a payment he is not eligible for, or 
2. Receives a payment he is eligible for but in the wrong amount. 
840-1 Causes of Incorrect Payments 
All overpayments must be referred to ORS no matter what the 
cause. However, ORS may treat the collection of an overpayment 
differently depending on its cause. For example, ORS can collect 
interest on an overpayment caused by intentional violation, but 
not on one caused by administrative error. 
1. Administrative Error 
Administrative errors are all mistakes made by state or local 
office staff in computing payments or eligibility. They 
include the local office or state staff: 
A. Delaying action on a reported change. 
B. Making a math error. 
C. Completing forms incorrectly. 
D. Applying policy incorrectly. 
2. Inadvertent Error 
Inadvertent errors are mistakes made by the client or his 
representative that are not intended. They include errors 
that result from: 
(Continued on next page) 





RECORDS AND GRANT MANAGEMENT - INCORRECT PAYMENTS 
Causes of Incorrect Payments 
A. Not understanding instructions and forgetfulness; 
B. A change that is reported more than 10 days after 
the change occurs by a client who had not received 
an explanation of the reporting requirements. 
3. Intentional Violation 
Intentional violations are deliberate breaches of program 
rules by the client or his representative. They include: 
A. Making false or misleading statements; 
B. Misrepresenting, concealing, or withholding facts; 
C. Posing as someone else; 
D. Not reporting the receipt of a financial assistance 
payment that the individual know her was not 
entitled to; 
E. Not reporting a change within 10 days after the 
change occurs, and the client knew they were 
supposed to report the change. 
840-1 Page 2 
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GENERAL PROVISIONS - FAIR HEARINGS 
190-7 What To Do When a Hearing Decision Is Received 
1. You must comply within ten days. A hearing decision is 
binding on both the state and regional offices. 
2. The Regional Director must review the case within thirty 
days to make sure the action has been taken. 
3. The State OFS will look at corrective action if a decision 
indicates a statewide problem. 
190-8 What To Do If the Decision or Appeal Causes An Overpayment 
When the hearing sustains the agency put the overpayment 
information on a 79. Send the 79 to the Office of Recovery 
Services. ORS will recover the assistance overpaid pending a 
hearing. 
190-9 How To Appeal A Decision 
1. The regional office can appeal a hearing decision only by 
filing a petition in District Court within 30 days of a 
hearing decision. 
2. The client can appeal a hearing decision to the Director of 
the Office of Administrative Hearings or to the District 
Court within 30 days of a hearing decision. 
190-9 
